Transfer of political authority from one administration to another, or from one government to another, is a common practice in politics around the world. Yet, the process of such a transfer is not unique, as it may be election based or not. On the one hand, such a transfer does not occur through elections in nondemocratic countries (in which people are not self-governing in terms of electing representatives and making rules). Such a transfer mostly occurs through periodic elections in democratic countries (in which people are self-governing in terms of electing representatives and making rules). Although most countries across the world hold regular elections to transfer legitimate political authority, elections in many countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa are not free and fair, thereby, meaning that the transfer of political authority from one government or administration to another is not fair.
In free or unfree and fair or unfair elections, the government system plays a vital role in many countries including Bangladesh. But there is a contradiction regarding the election-time government system that is a crucial political problem in the political history of Bangladesh. Briefly speaking, there are two types of governments during elections in Bangladesh: the party-in-power government or PPG, a form of government in which the regular or elected government or the party (or parties) in power stays in power during general election often without the dissolution of the parliament as there is no such provision in the National Constitution of Bangladesh, and the non-party caretaker government or the NCTG, a form of non-party government which normally takes office for an interim period until the elected government is formed through the general election. Historically, the PPG system was in place from the very beginning and is the predominant system in this country.
It is notable that immediately after its independence, Bangladesh constitutionally adopted parliamentary democracy — a system of democratic governance in which the executive branch derives its legitimacy from, and is held accountable to, the legislative branch and the parliament is the central institution of the government — as a form of government. Unfortunately, parliamentary democracy was subsequently retarded several times because of a number of reasons including military and semi-military regimes. With a few exceptions, however, parliamentary democracy has been growing relatively stable since its restoration after about sixteen years through the 12th amendment of the constitution in 1991. Yet, parliamentary democracy is at a transitional stage in Bangladesh.
Six general elections out of ten were held under the PPG system. Because of a lack of trust in the PPG system for the largely unfree and unfair elections of it, political parties demanded a neutral caretaker government for free, fair and credible general elections prior to 1990. Immediately after the stepdown of the government, because of massive anti-government movements by political parties and people, an NCTG system was initially and unofficially introduced based on the mutual understanding of major political parties. The Election Commission held the 5th general election under the NCTG system in 1991. Later many political parties including the BAL (Bangladesh Awami League) demanded the NCTG for subsequent elections and carried out almost relentless political movements since 1994.
The government came through the non-participatory 6th general election formalized the NCTG system through the 13th amendment of the Constitution of Bangladesh in March 1996. Four elections held under the NCTG are usually believed to be free, fair and credible. The then-regular government, however, abolished the NCTG system in June 2011 through the 15th amendment of the Constitution; consequently, the earlier PPG system was re-established. As was presumable, such a politico-structural change enormously affected the political situation of the country. Opposition political parties, particularly the BNP and its allies, immediately protested the abolishment, demanded the replacement of the NCTG and called on political strikes including hartals —a South Asian type of political protest — and nationwide blockades which mostly echoed the earlier political movements (1994-96) for the similar demand.
Under such circumstances, considerable uncertainties clearly persist on whether such a repeated and major political contradiction will culminate in any reasonable resolution and whether a reasonable government system during elections for a peaceful and fair transfer of political authority is possible. Where is then the resolution of the political problem regarding the PPG and the NCTG system during elections? What type of government system is necessary for free, fair and credible elections and fair transfer of political authority? How can such a government system be developed? How can such a potential election-time government system be reasonable to different parties, civil society and, above all, the people of Bangladesh?
In this article, I will develop a synthesis between the PPG and the NCTG systems and propose a reasonable government system that will help resolve the political problem regarding the government system during elections in Bangladesh. It is notable that synthesis is related to the dialectic system. Simply put, the dialectic is primarily considered to be a reasoning process of resolving contradictions or disagreements. Plato made Socratic dialogues, which aimed at resolving disagreements through rational dialogues for searching for truth, popular. Many thinkers later enriched the dialectic. But idealist Fredrich Hegel developed the concept of dialectic as a systematic method of overcoming contradictions into a higher-order progression. Materialist Karl Marx also contributed to the dialectic method by adopting the Hegelian dialectic approach in his analysis with the inversion of Hegel’s idealistic content into a materialist one. Many other scholars subsequently contributed to and adopted the dialectic method as a systematic analytic approach.
Simply put, dialectic has three basic stages: thesis (or affirmation), antithesis (or negation) and synthesis (or affirmation). A thesis might be an idea or a socio-political system that contains incompleteness within itself, antithesis is the negation of the thesis, and synthesis is the resolution of the contradictions between the thesis and the antithesis through reconciliations of their common truths or through the preservation of retainable points or coming-to-be-elements from opposite sub-entities with a higher order unity. The newly developed synthesis becomes another thesis and, because of its incompleteness, the new thesis subsequently subsumes in another synthesis through the conflicting phase of the antithesis. The dialectic process continues in the same fashion and, with each new synthesis, it gradually progresses human idea or history with a higher order unity, or a new totality, or a whole that covers everything of a particular dialectic progression and that is superior to all of its parts toward the ultimate or highest form of the dialectic progression of an idea or entity that has no more contradictions.
From a dialectic perspective, everything is considered to be composed of contradictory sub-entities. Like an idea or a history, political progression is thus dialectic, that is, political history or system transforms with dialectic contradictions. To be more specific, the election-time government system that transfers political authority from one administration to another through election is dialectic. That means that such a government system has contradictory sub-entities — the PPG and the NCTG systems and, hence, incompleteness within itself. Here, the thesis is the PPG system and the anti-thesis is the NCTG system, for the PPG system is a usual election-time government system and the NCTG system historically appeared as a negation of the PPG system. Progression of such a government system, thus, can only occur gradually through the dialectic process — thesis, antithesis and synthesis.
A Framework for Analyzing the Government during Elections
Prior to reaching a synthesis of the dialectic contradictions between the two government systems during elections, it is relevant to understand the framework — a framework for analyzing the government system during general elections — particularly developed here for analysis and reaching a synthesis. The framework consists of five components: the functioning of the government system during elections, the functioning of the election management bodies, foreign electoral intervention, electoral participation and electoral competition. This framework is pertinent, though other analyzing frameworks can be developed, and can greatly help analyze the contradictory sub-entities and reach a synthesis that can help solve the extant political problem in Bangladesh with a more desirable government system during elections.
Functioning of the government during elections
The core government (or the government or transitional government that governs the country during elections) that holds public office and governs during national-level elections has some crucial roles and responsibilities to play, depending on how elections are managed in a country. Even if elections are held by the EMBs (including independent EMBs), the main government has some roles and responsibilities, closely works with the EMBs and provides necessary support (the recruitment of relevant officials, providing budgets, equipments, supplies, etc.) to the EMBs for holding free, fair and credible elections. Various government departments that are not directly part of the election management body play vital roles in elections. The vital point is that the government may exert undue electoral influence or may not.
The type of functioning of the government such as non-partisan or partisan is vital. If the government functions in a non-partisan manner, elections are less likely to be unduly influenced; otherwise, partisan influence is highly likely. Free, fair and credible elections largely depend on partisan or non-partisan functioning (in the sense that it takes no side or does not favor any party, any coalition parties, any candidate or candidates) of the government during elections. In the latter case, the incumbent uses public resources (money, materials, transports, offices and employees) for partisan interests, exerts influence on the body/bodies related to election administration, etc. to make the playing field favorable and win the election, leading to unfair and unfree elections and electoral outcomes.
Functioning of the election management bodies
The organization and administration of elections in accordance with electoral laws and regulations are done by the Election Management Body or Bodies — an organization or a body that is either a stand-alone or a distinct management unit within a larger institution, and that usually has the sole purpose of, and is legally responsible for, managing some or all of the elements that are essential for the conduct of elections. The core functions of the EBMs usually include determining who is eligible to vote; receiving and validating the nominations of political parties and/or candidates and producing ballots; conducting polls; counting the votes; and tabulating and announcing the election results. But the government, political parties, interest groups, individual candidates, etc., can influence the EMBs, leading to unfree and unfair elections.
Whether the function of the EMBs, whose responsibilities are usually shared by the main body (such as the Election Commission, Department of Elections, Election Council, or any other equivalent body) with various bodies or agencies — different government agencies, civil society, etc. — depending on the type of election management bodies such as governmental, independent or mixed, is partisan or non-partisan in elections is, thus, crucial. While its non-partisan functioning leads to fair treatment of candidates and parties, impartial treatment of any electoral complaints, impartial implementation of electoral code of conduct, etc. its partisan functioning makes playing fields unfair and leads to partisan favored implementation of electoral laws, polling operations and, hence, unfree and unfair elections and electoral outcomes.
Foreign electoral intervention
Elections in a country are unduly influenced not only internally but also externally by foreign actors, particularly nations, international organizations, non-government organizations, etc., that function with internal links or actors. Foreign electoral intervention can be process intervention in which a foreign intervener seeks to support the rules of democratic contestation, irrespective of who wins; and partisan intervention in which a foreign intervener takes a stance on its support for one side through various means. If the process intervention is designed to help one contesting side, it can be considered to be partisan. Usually process intervention is less likely to affect electoral outcomes and sometimes it can be beneficial, but it is more likely to affect electoral outcomes if it aims at partisan favor.
Partisan foreign electoral interventions are two types: overt intervention in which an intervener explicitly declares its support usually with the means of promising the foreign population the transfer of particular resources, threatening the loss of existing resources, pre-election concessions or benefits to preferred party/candidate, etc.; and covert intervention in which an intervener secretly supports to a party or a candidate usually with the means of campaign materials, campaign funds, secret threats for favoring a particular party, propaganda against a particular candidate or a party, divulging of secret information to harm a particular candidate or a party, hacking of electoral database/servers, etc. Overt interventions are usually known to the average voter but covert interventions are not. A foreign actor may provide either overt, or covert, or both interventions in elections.
Partisan foreign intervention in competitive elections in different countries is usually given in order to shape electoral outcomes, place a favorable candidate or a political party in power and/or prevent an undesirable party or a candidate from favorable returns —the materialization of geopolitical or any other interests, reduction of any potential threats, etc. It is thus necessary to save elections from undue partisan foreign electoral intervention. Thus, whether the government system during the election can reduce the possibility of the success of partisan foreign influence at least to an acceptable level necessary for ensuring that electoral outcomes are externally uninfluenced is important for understanding such a government system.
Electoral participation
Electoral participation is an essential feature and quality of democracy and indicates the voluntary participation of citizens in electoral activities. Electoral participation has positive impacts on the formation of the government, shaping its decision-making processes and actions on public policies regarding the allocation of costs and benefits among individuals and groups in a society, increasing the effectiveness of the government, etc. Electoral participation can be understood by running or standing for the election, participation in electoral campaigns, voting, which is to be done without ballot box stuffing, office voting, voter intimidation and the casting of votes outside the polling stations and in the absence of election violence (or peacefully), etc., and other aspects of participation related to elections.
Reasonable electoral participation is the participation in elections by political parties (including major political parties) and running for offices, fair electoral campaigns and the participation of citizens in voting that reflects their voluntary and actual choice in a peaceful manner. Otherwise, elections are likely to be affected, leading to non-participatory elections, favoring one party or a group of parties over others in elections and bringing other negative outcomes including deaths and damage of properties before, during and after elections. Thus, whether the government system during elections is conducive to the reasonable electoral participation of parties and people in elections is important for holding free, fair and credible elections.
Electoral competition
The concept of electoral competition is rendered a degree and quality of democracy and indicates the closeness of the race. Electoral competition, though differently conceptualized and measured, may be understood by competition among multiple parties (including major parties) or candidates to win elections, the closeness of the race (vote difference and seat difference), a fair chance of winning elections by parties or candidates and some other aspects related to competition in elections. High electoral competition, which is also related to various aspects of electoral participation including participation in campaigns and voting, is desirable as it leads to improved democratic institutions, greater responsiveness and accountability of the government, the balance of power between the government and opposition and many other positive outcomes.
Low vote difference and seat difference are often rendered crucial in competitive elections, but high vote difference and seat difference may not be always unreasonable, as the performance of the government or any other political party, the popularity of any party or leader(s), etc. may reasonably lead to higher differences. But electoral competition can also be low because of the low participation of political parties for flawed electoral systems, unfair access to resources for electoral competition and undue electoral influence, making the electoral playing field unfair that favors one political party or candidate over others. Thus, whether the government system during elections is conducive to fair/reasonable electoral competition among political parties or candidates is important in holding free, fair and credible elections.
A Synthesis between the PPG and NCTG government
Briefly saying, the thesis — the party-in-power government system — consists of the existing Prime minister in the parliamentary system, but the existing President in the presidential system, as the head of the government and other ministers who mostly remain in their positions during the general election in Bangladesh. The existing elected representatives to the parliament including the existing prime minister (in the parliamentary system) vie in the general elections with the candidates of other parties including major parties often staying in power (with a few exceptions including the 1986 elections). The 1st-4th, the 6th and the 10th general elections were held under the PPG system that results in mostly unfree and unfair elections and but it is mostly one-sided.
In contrast, the anti thesis — the non-party government system — is comprised of a non-party Chief Advisor (equivalent to prime minister) and ten non-party advisors (equivalent to ministers) who take office once the parliament is dissolved with the main functions of creating an enabling environment and providing necessary supports to the EMBs to hold free, fair and credible elections and functions for three months unless the elected government takes office. The 5th and the 7th-9th general elections were held under this system. Despite the NCTG system’s appearing as a better alternative to the PPG system in holding elections and success in holding largely free, fair and credible elections, it is also somewhat/moderately one-sided.
The thesis is largely pro-government and mostly serves the interests of the party-in-power, consorts with electoral irregularities, etc. The negation of the thesis specifies that the PPG is incomplete, flawed and partisan and has many other negative aspects that undermines it and establishes that this system, as it is now, ceases to be a reasonable government system during elections. On the contrary, the antithesis is also somewhat anti-outgoing government and accordingly serves the interests of the opposition party of the outgoing government. The negation of the anti-thesis specifies that the NCTG system is somewhat/moderately incomplete, flawed and partisan and has many other negative aspects that clearly undermines it and establishes the notion that this system, as was constitutionalized earlier, ceases to be the reasonable alternative to the party-in-power system during elections. But there are several retainable elements of the opposite sub-entities.
First, it is reasonable to hold that the PPG system has mostly failed to function in a non-partisan manner in general elections. Its partisan functioning is because of the flaw in the formation of the system as a whole, which keeps one of the most competing political parties in power during elections and provides it with considerable scope for exerting partisan electoral influence on the Election Commission and various government departments and bringing electoral results in its favor in the absence of checks and balances, and several other reasons including the intention to stay in power by any means and the lack of well-developed democratic institutions in Bangladesh. The party-in-power, especially the elected officials of the government, has mostly taken advantage of the formational flaws to manipulate elections, exerted influence on election commission and various government departments including law-enforcement agencies and served its both reasoned and unreasoned interests, contributing to the unfair playing field in elections rather than playing its role without any partisan influence.
But the NCTG system has largely functioned in a non-partisan manner, provided the freedom, scope and support for the EMBs to play non-partisan electoral roles and served the reasoned interests of all the parties involved in the elections because of the absence of the party-based formational flaw in it and several other reasons including the lack of interests in staying in power by any means. Yet, this system is not completely flawless. There is an opportunity to place a favorable chief advisor in the non-party government, particularly through having the latest retired Chief Justice in accordance with the choice of any government, as was the case earlier, to get electoral favors. Moreover, and importantly, if the system favors any party in the absence of checks and balances, there are limited options to do against its partisan favor. Pertinently saying, it functioned in a partisan manner at least somewhat, intentionally or unintentionally, and favored two different political parties or groups of parties in the 2001 and 2008 elections in the name of creating the enabling environment.
Second, although the Election Commission or similar body can function in a nonpartisan manner in many countries, its constitutionally independent status does not always translate into its independent and non-partisan functioning in Bangladesh under the PPG system due to partisan influence by the party-in-power and the lack of the intention of the EMBs to function impartially. The EC and other agencies or officials of other agencies (including government officials and NGO employees) that play some roles in elections are usually not neutral, are mostly dominated by the party-in-power and have mostly failed to ensure a fair playing field for the competing political parties in terms of the application of electoral laws and rules (including the treatment of candidates and political parties, the implementation of electoral code of conduct, etc.) in an impartial manner and holding free, fair and credible elections.
The EMBs, on the contrary, mostly function in a partisan manner under the NCTG system due to various reasons including the absence of considerable partisan influence by the NCTG and the intention of the EMBs to hold free, fair and credible elections. This was visible in several elections held under this system, leading to largely free fair and credible elections. This may, however, not be the case always, as the EMBs have the opportunity to play partisan electoral roles under the NCTG system due to the government’s undue influence. Though there are no notable criticisms against the EMBs under the NCTG system in elections, the favorable attitude of the non-party government to any political party or a group of parties can make it partisan in terms of applying electoral rules, favoring one party over another.
Third, the PPG system may effectively deal with both covert and covert interventions. Pertinently saying, the PPG system in Bangladesh, similar to that of many other countries, has the opportunity to take necessary countermeasures with available resources (e.g., various state machineries and electronic and print media), depending on the means of both overt and covert foreign electoral intervention(s) and may largely reduce the possibility of the success of such intervention. Yet, foreign interventions in elections including targeted propaganda may still influence the voting patterns to some extent but this may not significantly affect the overall electoral outcomes in Bangladesh where there are a limited percentage of swing voters and a considerable percentage of voters unchangeably support the two most influential parties.
The problem — however — is that the PPG system is likely to take strong countermeasures against both overt and covert interventions given in favor of any opposition party (particularly when any opposition party or a candidate is a significant domestic actor), not against the interventions given in favor of the party-in-power (even if it is itself not a domestic actor). In the latter case, the party in power in Bangladesh, similar to many other countries, has the scope to utilize any type of foreign intervention for the electoral win. Besides, the party-in-power may provide less opportunity for other parties to take necessary measures against foreign intervention, particularly through limiting media access and other resources, due to various reasons including its interests in staying ahead of the opposition in the race and winning the elections, making overt and covert interventions successful against opposition parties.
The NCTG system has also the potential for taking countermeasures or reducing the chance of success of many sorts of overt and covert interventions (including promising the transfer of particular resources, threatening the loss of existing resources and campaign funds to any particular party) since its main aim is to hold elections, not political power. Unlike the PPG system that is particularly supportive of foreign interventions in its favor, the NCTG system has an advantage as it usually does not have any necessity to get such interventions in its favor due to its temporary formation with non-party advisors and main interests in holding free, fair and credible elections. In addition, and importantly, the non-party system may provide fair access for all political parties to resources especially media that may help take countermeasures against different sorts of partisan foreign electoral intervention.
But the earlier NCTG system itself can be a significant local actor for partisan foreign electoral intervention probably due to various causes including geopolitical influence, the instability in the development of democracy, excessively divisive politics and distrusting political culture. There is, consequently, a considerable opportunity for the foreign actor(s) to provide intervention by influencing the whole or a part of the advisory panel. Non-party advisors influenced by any foreign actor(s) may materialize the intervener’s interests, including the manipulation of elections and electoral outcomes to favor any particular party. The earlier NCTG system may thus be unable to save elections from foreign electoral interventions to an acceptable level, though this system can help reduce the chance of the success of many sorts of such interventions regardless of political parties.
Fourth, electoral participation is incredibly less reasonable under the PPG system. Major political parties mostly do not participate in elections. Out of six elections, only two elections held in 1973 and 1979 were participatory by major political parties but four elections held in 1986, 1988, (February) 1996 and 2014 were largely non-participatory by major parties. Up till now, major political parties including the BAL and the BNP boycotted several elections. The electoral campaign under the PPG system is largely unfair as candidates and supporters of the party-in-power get favored in campaigns by the state compared to those of the opposition or other parties because of biased access to media, less security of the voters and candidates of opposition parties, more incidents of arrests of leaders and activists of opposition parties in the pre-election period and on the day of elections, etc.
Among others, voter turnout is also low under the PPG system (roughly 47.89 percent). Mostly, the voters of the ruling party can cast votes under this system and most people are unable to go to the polling station and cast their votes because of threats imposed by the local ruling party leaders and cadres (in the absence of non—partisan functioning of law-enforcing agencies) and forcible cast of their votes by the political leaders and polling agents of the party-in-power and government officials. Political parties, media and electoral observers also criticize elections under this system as being manipulated by the party-in-power, depriving many people of their voting rights.
But electoral participation is notably high under the NCTG in Bangladesh. Political parties commonly participate in elections. Elections held in 1991, 1996, 2001 and 2008 under the NCTG system were participatory by all political parties including major parties – the BAL, the BNP and Jatiya Party. The electoral campaign is largely fair. Indeed, campaign-related irregularities — favored access of any party to electronic and print media, favored roles of security agencies to a particular party during campaign rallies, less security of voters and candidates of opposition parties, etc. — under this system are less. Yet, this system at least moderately contributed to unfair electoral campaigns due to its disfavored attitudes toward the outgoing governments. While the creation of an enabling environment or level playing fields for credible elections necessitated stresses on outgoing governments, disproportionate emphasis made the corresponding presence of local leaders between the outgoing party and other contesting parties imbalanced due to arrests and fear of possible arrests, thereby, leading to unfair electoral campaign, particularly in the 2001 and 2008 elections.
Among others, voter turnout is remarkably higher under the NCTG system (roughly 73.08 percent) in Bangladesh. More importantly, voters can cast their own votes in the elections under this system in a peaceful manner since there are almost no or limited threats from rival political leaders and cadres in elections, voters are mostly not prevented from voting and electoral violence is usually low due to more impartial role of law enforcing agencies in elections. There is almost no forcible cast of votes by the political leaders and polling agents of the party-in-power and votes are not cast by government officials in elections held under the non-party system.
Fifth, electoral competition is unbelievably low and unfair under the PPG system. Multiple parties or candidates mostly do not compete to win elections and candidates are sometimes elected uncontested. The race is also not mostly close (the average vote difference is 43.04 percent and the average seat difference is 204, with the average number of 236 and 30 seats won by the party-in-power and the opposition party respectively). Among others, the chance to win elections for the opposition is zero. Although opposition political parties frequently win elections in many countries, the opposition party has not won any elections held under the PPG system in Bangladesh since its independence in 1971. Though winning elections by the party-in-power is not unlikely through genuine votes, its winning of all elections is unbelievable. The low electoral competition (including high vote and seat differences) is because of the partisan functioning of the government and the EMBs, uneven playing field, irregularities in votes and several other reasons, rather than the outcomes of free, fair and credible elections.
Electoral competition under the NCTG system, on the contrary, is high and fair. Multiple parties or candidates compete to win the elections held under the NCTG system and no candidate wins the elections uncontested. The electoral race is largely fairly close (the average vote difference is roughly 5.23 percent and the average number of seat difference is 103, with the average number of 177 and 74 seats won by the winning party and the opposition party respectively). The chance of winning the elections by any major party is also very high. The two strongest political parties such as the BAL and the BNP equally won two general elections out of a total of four elections — particularly, the BNP in 1991, the BAL in 1996, the BNP in 2001 and the BAL in 2008 — held under the NCTG system in Bangladesh.
The better electoral completion in terms of various aspects under the non-party system is because of several causes including, but not limited to, the largely neutral functioning of the government system and the EMBs in elections. However, the somewhat overly disfavored attitude of the NCTG system towards the outgoing governments in the 2001 and 2008 elections, as already mentioned, led to the over-emphasis on its actions against the leaders of the outgoing governments. But such a disproportionate emphasis led to negative sentiments among the people. This consequently has played vital roles in the large vote and seat differences between the winning party and the opposition party in the 2001 and 2008 elections.
Given that both the systems are flawed, from the dialectic perspective, the forceful establishment of the PPG system will produce opportunistic distortion that occurs when the thesis does not take into account of coming-to-be-elements of the anti-thesis. In contrast, crude acceptance of the NCTG system reasonably produces an anarchistic distortion of dialectic that occurs when antithesis does not take account of coming-to-be-elements of the thesis. Thus, crude acceptance of any system is dialectically incomprehensible and a clear rejection of reasonable dialectic progression, as only coming-to-be-elements of the thesis and the anti-thesis (for example, the protection of some reasonable interests of the ruling party or the outgoing party, fair playing field and high electoral participation and electoral competition) together can ensure reasonable progression of the government system during elections.
According to the first law of dialectic (the law of the unity and conflict of opposites), the electoral government system is composed of mutually exclusive opposite sub-entities (e.g., the PPG and the NCTG system) and their unity can only be established through the sublation of the coming-to-be-elements of these sub-entities. Any government system that retains the reasonable deniable elements of the thesis and the anti-thesis cannot be reasonable. Thus, the reconstructed synthesis of the government system through the negation of the thesis and the negation of the anti-thesis or the third law of dialectic — the negation of the negation — may be any government system that rejects the above reasonable concerns, incorporates coming-to-be-elements and addresses incompleteness of the thesis and the anti-thesis.
Alternatively speaking, a reasonable government system during general elections in Bangladesh can be the one that functions on neutral grounds, under which the EMBs function in a neutral manner, which can reduce foreign electoral intervention to an acceptable level in a neutral manner, under which electoral participation is reasonable with the people’s actual choice and under which the electoral competition is fair.
A Proposed Electoral Government System
The reasonable government system during elections, I will call it the Electoral Government (EG), which exactly reflects the above synthesis, mainly aims at creating enabling conditions and providing necessary support to the Election Commission for holding free, fair and credible elections. But I will here propose one Electoral Government that I think will exactly or optimally reflect the above reconstructed synthesis of the government systems and help hold free, fair and credible elections in Bangladesh.
The proposed Electoral Government system comprises a non-party Chief Advisor, a few publicly acceptable political leaders from major political parties and a number of publicly acceptable non-political advisors. The number of ministers and advisors may be 10-12 or more. In this system, the parliament will be dissolved, the government will leave office and a non-party Chief Advisor will be the head of the government. One-third of the administrators will be political leaders and two-thirds will be non-party advisors. The President may recruit one-third of publicly acceptable non-party advisors in consultation with a few minor political parties (selected on the basis of a certain percentage of votes or any other reasonable means) or all other political parties that will have no representation of ministers in the Electoral Government and another one-third may be selected by the Chief Advisor. The Chief Advisor is equivalent to the Prime Minister, whereas other advisors are equivalent to ministers. Major political parties and the proportion of their leaders in the electoral government may be sorted out based on the proportional number of seats in the parliament or the average percentage of votes obtained in all earlier general elections (e.g., 15-20 percent votes or any other reasonable percentage).
There may be a number of possible Electoral Government systems that may reflect the synthesis. For instance, the Electoral Government may comprise 1) a number of political leaders from major political parties including the party-in-power, while the prime minister remains as the head of the government, 2) a few political leaders from major political parties and a few publicly acceptable non-party advisors, probably preferred by the President, while the prime minister remains as the head of the government, 3) a few political leaders from major political parties and a few publicly acceptable non-party advisors, probably preferred by the President, while a non-party Chief Advisor may be the head of the government, 4) a number of non-political advisors preferred by major political parties and a few publicly acceptable non-party advisors, probably preferred by the President, while a non-party Chief Advisor may be the head of the government, and 5) a number of political leaders from major political parties including the party-in-power, while a non-party Chief Advisor may be the head of the government.
It is relevant to note that the representation of ministers and/or non-political advisors from one major party is likely to put counterweight against any partisan influence of the ministers or non-political advisors of any other major political party and contribute to its non-partisan function in holding free, fair and credible elections by any of the governments noted above. But the direct inclusion of only political leaders as ministers/advisors from major political parties in putting the prime minister or the non-party chief advisor as the head of the government may lead to various risks including the possibility of conflicts of partisan interests among ministers/advisors of different parties, partisan electoral influence of the head of the government and a few ministers of the party in power and the dysfunction of the Electoral Government. This is probably because of the extent of distrust among major parties and the tendency to go to power by any means. Moreover, it may hinder from creating enabling ground that may require reshuffling the administrative set-up of the immediate past government and providing other parties to opportunity to come to the electoral field for campaigns and presence in the polling stations and for holding free, fair and credible elections.
But, given the existing intention of political parties to go to or remain in power by any means, distrust among political parties and a lack of cooperation on many aspects, another Electoral Government that is comprised of a number of advisors (10-12 or more) preferred by major political parties —based on the above-noted criteria — and a few publicly acceptable non-party advisors, probably preferred by the President in consultation with other political parties, and the Chief Advisor as the head of the government may also exactly reflect the synthesis at the optimum level, play role in an impartial manner and help hold free, fair and credible elections in Bangladesh. No doubt, such a government can make the Electoral Government genuinely impartial and limit the possibility of political influence on the Election Commission and the supportive agencies responsible for holding elections more.
But in the proposed Electoral Government system, publicly acceptable political leaders as advisors selected by major political parties and non-party advisors selected in consultation with a few minor parties are also likely to put counterweight against any partisan influence of any political party or any group of non-party advisors (if there are any such intention) and help ensure fair treatment of all the political parties in the elections. Moreover, and importantly, this Electoral Government will create opportunities for the much-needed political culture of cooperation on crucial issues and capacity to work together among contending major political parties on common interests that the parties lack due to the lack of trust among parties, revenge politics and many other causes, and increase the chance of holding free fair and credible elections under the party-in-power government system in the future, reflecting the responsiveness and commitment of political leaders.
But, moreover, because of the inclusion of different political parties (through their preferred advisors) in the proposed Electoral Government system, foreign electoral intervention (even if given by covert and/or overt means) is less likely to be successful. While covert intervention (such as hidden threats or pressures from any group) is unlikely to work, political parties will have a fair scope of countering overt electoral intervention. Electoral outcomes are also more likely to be accepted and post-election violence, along with pre-election and on-the-day-of-election violence is also less likely under the proposed Electoral Government system. Thus, the proposed Electoral Government system is more likely to avoid both the anarchistic and the opportunistic distortion of dialectic, overcome the current political contradictions regarding the government system during general elections and put forward the extant electoral contradictions in Bangladesh into a higher-order unity.
It may be argued that the Electoral government (example 2) that comprises a few ministers from major political parties and a few publicly acceptable non-party advisors, probably preferred by the President, while the prime minister remains the head of the government, along with other options such as example 1 and 5, can also help generate political cooperation and have political transformational possibility. But — in addition to the above criticism — it is likely that the existing prime minister alone (as in Example 1 and 2) can significantly influence the Electoral Government given the politicization of the public administration, the eagerness to remain in power by any means and several other causes, though non-party advisors in the panel can play roles for its non-partisan functioning. Consequently, instead of the development of a culture of political cooperation among political parties, examples 1, 2 and 5 are more likely to present major challenges and influence the electoral outcomes.
Of the two more reasonable governments, such as the Proposed Electoral government and the one in Example 4 (in which, one-third of non-party advisors can be selected by major political parties, another one-third of the advisors by the president in consultation with the selected or all minor parties and another one-third of advisors by the chief advisor) which can play non-partisan roles in the elections and help hold free, fair and credible elections, I believe that proposed one is the more reasonable reflection of various elements of the reconstructed synthesis. Indeed, this EG system has rejected all reasonable concerns of the thesis — the PPG system — and the anti-thesis — the NCTG system — and preserved their coming-to-be-elements by taking their incompleteness into account. Moreover, and importantly, it has the scope of playing the much-needed transformational role in politics from the lack of trust and cooperation among political parties to cooperation among them on crucial problems that may gradually help develop their responsibleness and can lead to better politics including holding free, fair and credible elections even staying in power in the future in Bangladesh.
Yet, the proposed government system has several concerns including, but not limited to, the possibility of partisan influence by political leaders of the outgoing party, the possibility of the conflict of interests among political leaders of different parties and the possibility of resignation for making the electoral government unreasonably questionable or dysfunctional (probably because of sensing their defeat in elections or other reasons). Consequently, laws and regulations are needed to make sure that various potential concerns associated with the proposed electoral government are addressed and that the government and the Election Commission and supportive agencies including the home ministry during elections can play their roles in an impartial manner to hold free, fair and credible elections in Bangladesh.
It is to note that a publicly acceptable non-party Chief Advisor needs to be selected based on some reasonable criteria in order to increase the chance of the non-partisan role in elections and the interim government and avoid any potential political conflicts — as was the case in the selection of an earlier Chief Advisor. Besides, a number of political leaders and publicly acceptable non-party advisors in the government should be selected based on some reasonable criteria. But running advisors in the government should be allowed to contend in the elections but they may be given to participate in the next general elections. Unlike the earlier non-party government system, a Chief Advisor in any of the above EG systems should not be predominantly selected from the retired Chief Justice or from the retired judges of the Appellate Division; instead, any other qualified non-party eminent citizen of the country may be predominantly appointed as a Chief Advisor.
It is further notable that the proposed interim government will only perform day-to-day, or routine, or non-controversial administrative activities rather than making any new laws and policies and introducing any new or large-scale expenditures. But if any urgent situations (wars, etc.) arise, the Electoral Government needs to perform major policy decisions and related activities in consultation with major political parties, unless the newly elected government takes office. Besides, the electoral government should be taken into account for a certain period for holding elections. Given that political parties and leaders become responsible and reflect the commitments to their responsibilities in the government and outside, the proposed electoral government system may not be needed and can be replaced by the party-in-power government system.
Concluding Comments
Though the proposed Electoral Government system is the most reasonable Electoral Government, people need to have the scope to make the decision on it. But before that the general consensus of the leaders of political parties including the contradictory political parties and the members of civil society primarily on the proposed electoral government on reasonable grounds is important. If no consensus is established, a direct referendum needs to be carried out to identify the reasonable electoral government system between the proposed one and another one noted in example 4. The inclusion of people in the resolution of the problem regarding the EG system is certainly an important move toward solving it. In fact, the choices of people’s representatives may not always represent people’s choices in making major changes.
Sometimes people’s choices are necessary and may be helpful— particularly when political leaders fail to solve any problem that considerably affects people and the country. Pertinently saying, people are the source of political authority or power and the ultimate decision-makers in democracy. A reasonable EG system is undoubtedly important to the people, as only such a system can provide the necessary support for holding free, fair and credible elections, truly help people reflect their voluntaristic mandate and fairly transfer political authority from one administration to another. But the lack of it deprived people of casting their votes many times in Bangladesh. Consequently, the right to vote remained in a state of deprivation or denial of recognition for most of the time.
It is notable that the denial of the recognition of the right to vote, notably, is considered to be a motivational basis in some contexts for emancipatory political struggle, particularly when the denial is collective. Since this article neither aims at political revolution nor focuses on any particular political party, I strongly believe that a referendum, as the instrumental good or as a means for attaining further good, can ensure people’s political autonomy in solving the mentioned political problem regarding the government system during elections, which considerably affected the politics of Bangladesh for several decades, that can help choose the electoral government that can help ensure their rights to votes in elections.
But the major problem with referendums is that these do not always reflect people’s actual choices, as these may be manipulated. To be specific, a few referendums — the Bangladesh Presidential Confidence Referendum in 1977, the Bangladesh Military Rule Referendum in 1985 and the Bangladesh Constitutional Referendum in 1991 — have been conducted in Bangladesh. All or the majority of the referendums are largely criticized for manipulated results with considerable irregularities. Thus, steps are crucial to ensure that the referendum is conducted in a free, fair and credible manner and that it reflects people’s actual choice. Once a free, fair and credible referendum is carried out, the choice of the majority of the people will lead to a more reasonable EG system (or a qualitative change) in Bangladesh. Only then, according to dialectic, a higher-order unity between the incomplete and contradictory sub-entities of the election-time government systems will be established.
It is pertinently notable that this article is based on the concept of dialectic and the assumption that the EG system is dialectic and transforms with the dialect process. But the concept of dialectic as a whole is not beyond any criticisms; for example, Karl Proper, a philosopher of science and a considerable critique of dialectic, criticizes that the dialectic approach is applicable to some contexts but not generally to all contexts, and that dialectic synthesis is the mere construction of the best parts of the thesis and anti-thesis rather than a new idea. The problem here, I think, is undoubtedly contradictory and, that’s why, the concept of dialectic goes with it very well; besides, the reconstructed synthesis is not the mere outcome of the best elements of contradictions, rather it contains a new idea – and represents a solution to a problem – that is a higher-order unity or a gradual progression of dialectic contradictions.
But detailed laws and regulations are necessary in order to address the reasonable concerns of the EG system, chosen through the referendum, in order to ensure free, fair and credible elections and fair transfer of political authority. Lacking scope, however, this article does focus on identifying the specific rules and obligations of the potential government system. Yet, I shall provide a few comments that may be taken into consideration for devising necessary rules and obligations after an EG system is finally chosen. Particularly speaking, the contractarian doctrine may be a more reasonable option, as it has a stronger influence on, and more reasonableness of, demonstrating the origination of the state, the legitimacy of government and providing a moral ground on how agreements should be made than that of any other relevant theories including the divine right theory and the natural right theory.
Although there are differences among proponents of this moral and political doctrine, this doctrine renders the State as the product of mutual agreement of the people and predominantly indicates that individuals in the State of Nature —a stateless situation — had no civil government to punish transgressors, stop war, protect property, etc. However, individuals finally consented to each other in a voluntary manner and agreed to authorize a sovereign with the provisions that define basic rights and duties. Such an agreement, as is more commonly believed, made the transition from the state of nature to a civil state. Accordingly, citizen’s and the government’s moral and political obligations depend upon agreements. That means that the sovereign authority (or government) and the governed (or people) are morally bound to abide by agreements. The legitimacy of a government, according to this doctrine, mostly depends on whether agreements made reflect general will, or common good, or the people’s interests, or choices that rational persons would give consent to.
Even though such a state-of-nature-based explanation of the origination of the state has been considered to be hypothetical and criticized on several grounds such as historical, legal and philosophical, the contractarian doctrine has merits and can be used to assess and determine laws and public policies in a country. The contemporary social contract theory, particularly developed by John Rawls, takes the existence of the state as a given and the state of nature as a hypothetical situation that leads to a certain conception of justice. That means that the contemporary social contract theory is considered to be a mechanism for identifying or devising principles in order to assess and determine the justice of political constitutions and economic and social arrangements. In this regard, the idea of the original position in John Rawls’ theory of Justice as Fairness may be particularly considered.
Simply put, the original position is a hypothetical initial contractual situation that replaces the imagery of the earlier social contract theorists’ conception of the state of nature. It limits every possibility of a particular favor to any individual or group. In the original position, parties — free and equal citizens who are considered to be reasonable or rational persons, have their capacity to form, revise and pursue a conception of the good, have a sense of justice, etc. — select a set of principles considered to be fair, work out necessary terms and conditions and make fair agreements for social contract. This thought experiment that locates appropriate initial choice situations is considered to be better than trying to actually get all real citizens to assemble in person to try to agree to principles of justice for their society. That is to say, it is to imagine from the position of free and equal citizens who jointly agree upon and commit themselves to principles of social and political justice.
Generally, in a parliamentary democracy, the legislative body elected by the people makes terms and conditions (on various concerns) that are considered to have the consent of the people. Thus, various government institutes and terms and conditions made by the representatives are considered to be social contracts. Unfortunately, terms and conditions made on various issues are not always fair to the people. Thus, measures should be taken to devise fair terms and conditions (or rules and obligations) of the EG system so that rational persons or free and equal citizens would assent to such terms and conditions under fair circumstances and they lead to the desirable functioning of the government. Usually, those terms and conditions that are made from the interests of all stakeholders and discussed with relevant stakeholders often appear to be more reasonable reflections of the interests of all.
The main point is that the terms and conditions of the potential Electoral Government system are to be devised by imagining the position of such a hypothetical choice situation — or, alternatively, in such an impartial way — that reflects the fair share of all concerned groups. Furthermore, for any social contract or agreement to be justified, according to the publicity condition of the theory of justice as fairness, the principles of justice chosen by the parties will be publicly known and recognized as the basis for cooperation on fair terms. This implies that people (or all relevant stakeholders) will neither remain uninformed nor have false beliefs about fair terms and conditions of agreements. It, therefore, seems reasonable that the terms and conditions of the potential Elected Government should be publicly known in order that people can accept and cooperate on these.
Certainly, changes in political systems are a common and unending feature in world history. Even though antagonism plays a prominent role, progression in political structure does not always necessitate political revolution. But political revolution within the ambit of the radical structuralist paradigm or specifically revolutionary socialism — the socialist doctrine that indicates that revolution is necessary in order to make fundamental changes in society — brings radical transformation in exchange for considerable destruction. In contrast, radical social change is possible through reformism — the belief that indicates that existing socio-political institutions can ultimately change a society’s fundamental structures, political systems, etc. through a gradual process — rather than political revolution. Indeed, many countries around the world incorporate progressive reforms based on tensions between incomplete current reality and its necessity for developmental continuity.
The people of Bangladesh resolved several major problems in the past. Several stronger political movements, particularly those that aimed at major changes, supported by the people mostly resulted in either the overthrow of the government or the reasonable acceptance of the demands by the government. I believe that people will also resolve the present politically vowed immutability of the apparently mutable contradictory government systems peacefully. Many countries across the world often render the referendum as a more viable option for the resolution of constitutional and other major problems. I here conclude with the suggestion that the political contradictions regarding the electoral government system are to be resolved based on the above proposal by the people through a referendum.
I am grateful to Friedrich Hegel, Karl Marx, John Locke, John Rawls, Karl Proper and many others for their remarkable writings on various relevant ideas, concepts and measures that greatly enriched my understanding and helped me much in writing this article.
NB: Some parts of this article were previously published in the Daily Observer (on Oct 13-14 and Oct 31-Nov 01) and the book entitled “Toward A Better World: Challenges and Pathways” (written by Amir M Sayem and published in 2021).
DISCLAIMER: The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Magazine and its editorial team. Views published are the sole responsibility of the author(s).
