Regime change in Iran has been frequently talked about. The latest anti-government movement across Iran, which began after the rise in the currency value, has also resurfaced the issue of regime change in Iran. Many participants in the movements have demanded a regime change. Many in Iran and around the world have considered the possibility of regime change due to the scale of the protest movement and external threats involved in it at a time of a somewhat weakened Iranian regime due to military campaigns of Israel and Iran in recent months. But it probably seems far away — at least for now — keeping the issue of regime cha
The regime change has been sought by both international and local actors. There is a mix of internal and geopolitical reasons for seeking regime change in Iran. A deep-seated internal discontent, geopolitical rivalries, and security threats are some of the vital reasons. Regime change has been an issue of international politics since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 that ousted the then Western favored Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. While there are separate international actions against the regime, there is sometimes a direct linkage between international and internal efforts for regime change. Recent large-scale, nationwide protests that signal deep public dissatisfaction, fueled bydegraded economic conditions and a lack of addressing grievances over the present regime, have received direct support from international actors.
At the international level, the United States and Israel are in the forefront and most active for regime change in Iran. They have pursued regime change through various ways since the 1979 revolution, led to the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran (which was previously the Imperial State of Persia), rendered a theocratic state where religious leadership, headed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, replaced secular rule, evolving from containment to hybrid warfare involving sanctions, cyberattacks, covert operations, support for dissidents, and recent direct military pressure. The recent military pressure has particularly focused on Iran’s nuclear program, though these efforts have often strengthened the regime’s resolve, leading to recent escalations like direct Israeli strikes and increased US involvement in the efforts.
Though the United States and Israel generally agree that a change in Iran’s regime is desirable to end its nuclear ambitions and regional interference, they sought regime change inconsistently and differ significantly on the timing, approaches methods, and tolerance for risks associated with achieving that goal. Due to national interests in the region, Iran’s growing military capability including nuclear programs and an intention to support the reginal proxies, along with several other causes, the US has historically wavered between diplomatic pressure and coercive action — often fearing the consequences of a power vacuum in Tehran — rather than direct military engagement with an aim to severely weaken the regime and compel the regime to alter its behavior.
But Israel views a nuclear-armed Iran as an existential threat to its survival. Consequently, Israel generally advocates for more direct, unilateral, aggressive, and immediate approaches and actions such as direct strikes on nuclear facilities, nuclear scientists and leadership including the military and political leadership to force regime change, regardless of the potential for a wider regional war. But pertinently saying, despite the desire for regime change, there is debate within Israeli intelligence regarding whether to actively force a collapse of the regime, which could lead to unpredictable chaos, or to maintain pressure, with some preferring to hope for the best while preparing for the worst.
But internally, as of January 2026, the efforts aimed at regime change in Iran have gradually intensified. Regime change efforts within Iran have evolved from fragmented, ideologically driven protests in the early years of the Islamic Republic to broad-based, nationwide, and systemic challenges in the 2020s due to a combination of internal economic mismanagement, social repression, and the erosion of the regime’s legitimacy. The major anti-government movements in recent years are the 2009 Green Movement protests, the 2022 Woman, Life and Freedom movement and the ongoing 2025-06 movement. The focus of the movements has shifted from demanding reforms within the system to a widely shared desire for the outright collapse of the theocratic structure of Iran built after the 1979 revolution.
Tehran, Iran (Credit: https://pixabay.com/).
Different parties, along with general people, including the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the Solidarity for a Secular Democratic Republic in Iran (Hamgami) and the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), are internal actors and involved in movements for regime change. Though the parties differ in terms of their ideologies and approaches, they aim to change the regime and ensure a more democratic Iran. In addition to parties or groups, opposition figures or individuals including Reza Pahlavi, the son of Reza Shah Pahlavi who was overthrown in the 1979 Iranian Revolution, who positioned himself as a secular and democratic leader have been advocating for regime change, calling for international support to weaken the current Islamic Republic by targeting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and supporting protestors.
But international and internal efforts have so far failed to change the Iranian theocratic regime. A variety of reasons including internal regime resilience, strong security apparatus, a lack of a unified opposition, the unintended consequences of external pressure, and strategic miscalculations by foreign powers have been preventing regime change in Iran. Pertinently saying, regime resilience stems from Iran’s deep institutional structure, significant coercive power (including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), control over the state apparatus, and proven willingness to use extreme violence, enabling it to withstand economic crises, sanctions, and mass protests, even as recent unrest highlights vulnerabilities and potential internal shifts.
As of early 2026, despite intense economic sanctions, military strikes by Israel, and internal unrest, the Islamic Republic has maintained its hold on power through a sophisticated security apparatus and the creation of a “resistance economy” long designed to withstand external pressure against the regime. But the lack of unified opposition, which spans ethnic groups, nationalists, and leftists, to the regime and the absence of a single leader in the protest movement have probably limited the effectiveness of internal efforts against a determined state. The opposition, which demands a shift toward a secular democratic system that separates religion from government, has consequently so far remained weak against the regime.
But different international attempts to bring about a regime change in Iran — especially driven by US-led “maximum pressure” sanctions, international isolation, and, sometimes, direct external military confrontation — have profound and often detrimental impacts on Iran in a variety of ways. These have led to deeper economic dysfunction, cycles of escalating violence, fractured opposition and increased social repression, along with significant regional instability as neighbors fear shifts in trade, energy, and regional power dynamics. But the ordinary people of Iran especially the middle class and vulnerable groups have suffered the most.
The impacts of the regime change efforts are often characterized by severe economic distress, rising living costs and profound consequences for the livelihood of ordinary people in Iran, with the most severe effects occurring between 2012–2019 and again during the 2024–2026 economic crisis. Though the efforts have been intended to weaken the governing regime, these have led to a significant contraction of the economy, reducing oil exports by 60–80 percent and causing severe impacts on GDP, but it reduced the middle class by an estimated average of 17 percentage points annually between 2012–2019, causing widespread poverty in Iran and disrupting support though social safety nets to impoverished people.
The international efforts to bring regime change have triggered intensified state coercion in Iran. The Iranian regime has responded with a violent and coordinated crackdown by security forces, leading to high death tolls, arbitrary arrests and detention and an internet blackout. Many Iranians, particularly the youth and middle class, who view the theocratic system as a “dead end” with no potential for improvement, have become the targets of the repression of the decades-long regime. In the 2022 anti-government movement, several thousand people were killed, while it has turned out to be around 10000 in the latest movement.
Geopolitical rivalries and regime change efforts are not surprising at all. These are present in other regions. Geopolitical rivalries of the US and Israel with Iran will probably continue due to differing national interests, religious and ideological differences and other reasons. Consequently, international efforts for regime change will continue in the future too. Besides, growing state repression and coercion including killings and arbitrary detention and increased desire among people for democratic governance, along with public discontent over economic distress and corruption, will drive internal motivation for regime change efforts in Iran.
But given that the efforts of regime change and rivalries between the United States and Israel with Iran have led the Iranian people to suffer the most, efforts are needed to reduce their impacts. Even if there is a regime change or not, driven by both international and domestic efforts, this is vital. Both the external parties and the government of Iran need to revise their approaches. Western sanctions need to consider their adversarial impacts on ordinary people. Those sanctions that functioned more as a tool to impose severe economic pain and have rather impacted the lives of the ordinary people need to be revised.
International efforts especially sanctions for regime change have often backfired, resulting in the strengthening of the Islamic Republic’s domestic power rather than its collapse — though these have some achievements such as causing economic downturns and forcing Iran to the negotiating table and put some sorts of pressure on the government of Iran. Moreover, sanctions have not compelled a fundamental change in behavior or achieved stated policy goals, reduced defense budgets and uniformly crippled the wealthy; rather, they have created opportunities for those with close ties to the IRGC and the Supreme Leader’s office. International efforts have consequently been rather paradoxically benefiting a small, well-connected, and wealthy elite.
Given the extent of rivalries, the possibility of imposing further sanctions on Iran remains in the future. But, importantly, it is difficult to be certain about whether further sanctions can change the regime in Iran. While they can create further, long-term economic instability that may further weaken the government, they are not a guaranteed catalyst for regime collapse on their own. Rather, further and abrupt sanctions will probably increase the sufferings of the people in economic terms and increase state repression especially against those who seek regime change. Instead of abrupt sanctions, talks based approach may help reduce rivalries and tensions.
But the government of Iran needs to refrain from brutality against dissent and address reasoned concerns. It is vital to reduce economic impacts and improve economic conditions, secure civil liberties, address overturning strict state restrictions, and ensure freedom of expression. Iran also needs to refrain from arbitrary arrests and detention merely for national security concerns and uphold the rights of people. For this, instead of creating force, talks are desirable and can be more helpful.
