Sudan conflicts have been going on for more than three years. In the war, more than 150 thousand people have been killed and more than 12 million people have been displaced so far from the capital city and other areas. But there is no indication of ending the Sudan war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by General Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, and there is a failure of peace efforts, though its extent has reduced. More importantly, it remains uncertain whether the war will end soon.
But optimistically saying, several peace efforts have been made to end the war, which was mainly driven by power struggles between the two leaders. Of the initiatives, the 2024 Jeddah talks, facilitated early on by the United States and Saudi Arabia, the 2025 QUAD initiative, and the 2025 Sudanese government Peace Plan are notable. But the Quad initiative — a joint initiative involving the US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE — that outlines a three-month humanitarian truce, a permanent ceasefire, and a nine-month political transition toward civilian governance is a promising initiative taken by outside actors. It may end the Sudan war, but it has so far failed to do so, even if ceasefires were reached and implemented, especially on humanitarian grounds.
The Quad proposal was mostly rejected by the parties. The SAF, which controls Khartoum and eastern Sudan, outright rejected the initiative. The RSF welcomed components of the Quad statement but without commenting on the push for a truce. Various reasons have hindered its implementation. Internal rifts among the mediators, such as Egypt and the UAE, the lack of representation of the warring parties in making the peace framework, and competing agendas of the warring parties are notable. While the peace proposal is rendered as an imposed external intervention rather than a negotiated settlement, there is the persistence of competing political and ideological agendas within Sudan’s fragmented landscape.
But perceived bias and a lack of credibility regarding the mediators — due to their divergent regional endgames and proxy alignments — have played a role in the failure. The SAF has said the proposal favors the RSF, preserves the paramilitary’s territorial gains, and undermines national sovereignty by demanding security and structural rollbacks. It has outright objected to the participation of certain regional actors, such as the UAE, in the mediation. The SAF has accused the UAE of providing active backing to the opposing Rapid Support Forces in the Sudan war.
Even if any of the mediating parties support a particular warring party, it is not always problematic for reaching peace since there are other mediators. This sort of mediation effort can raise doubt on reasonable grounds, but there are many similar examples of peace initiatives. The US provided arms and money to Israel but made peace initiatives in the Gaza war and the Lebanon war, along with other mediators. Moreover, Qatar hosted Hamas political leadership and maintains distinct regional channels but acted as a vital mediator, along with Egypt and the US, to negotiate ceasefires and hostage releases in the Gaza war.
But peace talks need to be continued with the Quad Framework. To find a negotiated settlement, the two warring parties, which have largely prioritized battlefield objectives and military control over a negotiated political transition, need to be directly brought to the discussion table — not through separate channels or indirect proximity talks. The framework needs to consider the problems on the ground through talks with the warring parties. The emphasis can be given to the territorial control in the post-war governance and post-war governance.
But to be successful with the peace initiative, measures are needed to compel outside patrons to halt the ongoing flow of money and weapons into the conflict zones. Moreover, and importantly, the emphasis needs to be given to the implementation mechanism. A lack of an enforceable mechanism has led to the failure of earlier initiatives and the maintenance of ceasefires reached on humanitarian grounds. There were violations of temporary ceasefires by both parties.
